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1. Regulation of corruption crimes in the Penal Code  
The brazilian Penal Code (hereinafter CP) describes the corruption crimes into 
two autonomous types: on the one hand, he characterized the crime of passive 
corruption (art. 317 CP) in "Title XI, chapter I, which deals with "crimes committed 
by public officers against the general administration". On the other hand, the 
crime of active corruption (art. 333 CP) in "Chapter II, which deals with "crimes 
practiced in particular against the administration in general ".  
It is necessary to point out that, although the Penal Code accepted, as a rule, 
the monist theory, it creates, in relation to certain crimes, some exceptions in 
favor of the pluralist theory, as it occurs precisely in relation to the crimes of 
corruption. So, for a single fact of corruption, if the public officer “receives”, for 
himself or for others, directly or indirectly, an undue advantage, or accepts the 
promise of such an advantage, there is a crime of necessary bilateral participation 
of several subjects in which each active subject responds for a different crime: 
the corrupt officer (intraneus) who receives the undue advantage responds as 
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perpetrator of the crime of passive corruption (art. 317 CP), while the private 
person (extraneus) that corrupts the employee  and offers him or promises an 
undue advantage, to determine him to practice, omit or delay an sua sponte 
action, responds as the actor of crime of active corruption (art. 333 CP). 
However, it may happen that the employee refuses the offer or undue promise, 
when there will only be a crime of active corruption (art. 333 CP). And if the public 
officer takes the initiative and performs the conduct of “asking” for himself or for 
others, directly or indirectly, an undue advantage – regardless of whether the 
individual accepts or refuses to deliver an undefined advantage –   will be held 
responsible only for a crime of passive corruption. (art. 317 CP), because in this 
case: a) the intraneus conduct of “requesting” an undue advantage denotes that 
he is already corrupted; b) in addition, the penal type of art. 333 CP does not 
describe the conduct of handing over or giving undue advantage to a public 
officer3.     
The Penal Code also punish the crime of privileged corruption (paragraph 2 
art. 317 CP). It is an crime autonomous (sui generis) in relation to the basic form 
of passive corruption provided for in the caput of art. 317 CP, considering that the 
civil servant does not seek any undue advantage, but stops practicing or delays 
an sua sponte action, with a breach of functional duty, yielding to the request or 
influence of others. 
It is also worth mentioning that the special legislation also punishes other forms 
of corruption (active or passive) that occur in other specific areas, such as: a) tax 
(article 3, subsection II, of Act n. 8.137/1990, which defines crimes against the 
tax, economic and consumer relations); b) electoral (article 299 Act n. 4.737/65 - 
Electoral Code); c) sports competitions (art. 41-C Act n. 12.299/2010); d) 
international commercial transactions (art. 337 – B CP)4. 
Finally, it is necessary to point out that in Brazil there is no crime of corruption 
between private individuals. Thus, cases of corruption in football such as those 
that occurred in 2015, in the so-called FIFA-GATE, would go unpunished. 
However, the New Penal Code Project (Senate Bill n. 236/2012) describes the 
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crime of corruption among private individuals, thus aligning itself with other 
European Union countries (Italy, Spain, France, Germany, and England), which 
have already punish such crime, in line with the guidelines of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977, of the UN Convention on Combating Corruption, 
of 2009, as well as of the Bribery Act of 2010, which advocate, at a global level, 
the punishment of bribery in the private sphere. 
A comparison between the two basic types of corruption provided for in the CP 
reveals that while the law in relation to the crime of passive corruption (art. 333 
CP) expressly describes as its constitutive element "act of office", in turn, the type 
law of the crime of active corruption (art. 317 CP) does not require such an 
elementary circumstance of the crime. An “sua sponte action” is understood to 
be one that falls within the scope of the civil servant's functional duties.   
The Supreme Federal Court (henceforth STF), since the trial of AP 470-MG, 
in the widespread case called “Mensalão – scheme of payment of undue 
advantage to parliamentarians to form an “ally base” to the federal government 
in the Chamber of Deputies – changed its judicial precedents and started to 
consider that the “sua sponte action” is not an elementary circumstance of the 
crime of passive corruption (article 317 CP), but only one cause of increase of 
the penalty (§ 1o of the same legal provision). Therefore, for the consummation 
of this crime, it is sufficient to request or receive an unlawful advantage due to 
the civil service, and the subsequent practice of sua sponte action is irrelevant. 
For the attribution  of the passive corruption crime, it is not necessary to describe 
a specific “sua sponte action”, the causal link between the offer (or promise) of 
undue advantage (payment of bribes) and the duties of the public officer being 
sufficient, acting the public officer no longer in the public interest, but in favor of 
your personal interests5.  
2. The brazilian anti-corruption Act 
The Anti-Corruption Act n. 12.846, of 8/1/2013, hereinafter LAC, has the 
structural objectives of controlling the acts of corruption committed by legal 
entities within the scope of the Public Power, in Brazilian territory or abroad, 
                                                     
5AP 470, MG, rel. Min. Joaquim Barbosa, j. 17/12/2012; AP 694/MT, rel. Min. Rosa Weber, 1a. 
T., j. 02/05/2017; AO 2057/RN, rel. Min. Luiz Fux, 1a. T., j. 02/10/2018; Inq 4506/DF, rel. Min. 
Marco Aurélio, rel. Min. Roberto Barroso, 1a. T., j. 17/04/2018. 
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establishing systems and requirements administrative and civil liability, their 
respective sanctions, rules on compliance programs and the leniency agreement.   
LAC is applicable to a wide range of legal entities: corporate or simple 
companies, personified or not, regardless of the form of organization or corporate 
model adopted, foundations, associations of entities or persons, foreign 
companies, which have their headquarters, branch or representation in the 
territory Brazilian, constituted in fact or by law, even if temporarily (sole paragraph 
art. 1 LAC). 
2.1. Liability systems  
The liability system is cumulative: the liability of the legal entity does not 
exclude the individual liability of its directors or administrators or of any natural 
person, perpetrators or accomplices in the illegal act (art. 3 LAC). 
The anti-corruption Act provides for two types of liability for legal entities, which 
correspond to two types of processes for investigating their harmful acts and 
applying sanctions that complement each other. 
2.1.1. Administrative liability 
First, the legislation establishes an administrative process with punitive 
sanctions for activities corruptives that are harmful to the State (art. 5 of the LAC), 
whose purpose is the protection of the legal good represented by the damage to 
the principles of public administration: morality and probity of the State (articles 
6, 7 and 8. LAC). 
The competence to initiate and judge the Administrative Accountability 
Process - PAR of the legal entity lies with the maximum authority of each body or 
entity of the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Powers, that is, it is the 
maximum authority of the entity against which it was committed the harmful act, 
or, in the case of a direct administration body, of its Minister of State (art. 8º. LAC 
and art. 3º of Decree n. 8420/2015). 
The administrative liability of legal entities follows the strict liability criterion, 
regardless of the proof of subjective liability in relation to the corrupt activity of 
the legal entity or individual6. 
                                                     
6 COSTÓDIO FILHO, Ubirajara e ANACLETO ABDUCH SANTOS, José. In VV. AA. Comentários 
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It is sufficient to prove the company's corruptive harmful act and the causal link 
among the act and the harmful result to the public administration, even if it is not 
possible to identify the individual. The corporation objectively assumes 
administrative responsibility and its civil effects (compensation) for its lack of 
organizational capacity in compliance with the legislation. 
Article 5 LAC defines a detailed series of harmful acts to public administration, 
national or foreign, practiced by legal entities that violate national or foreign public 
assets, principles of public administration or international commitments assumed 
by Brazil. 
The administrative proceeding has a punitive nature, requiring, therefore, the 
observance of numerous criminal and procedural guarantees: a) principle of 
legality (nullum crimen sine lege) and prohibition of analogy in relation to the 
harmful acts provided for in the list of art. 5th LAC; b) due process of law: right to 
contradictory and broad defense (art. 8, in fine, LAC); c) right to evidence; d) 
standard of proof that requires overcoming any reasonable doubt; e) 
individualization of penalties in accordance with the principles of reasonableness 
and impartiality; f) the right to appeal to the Judiciary against the decision on the 
merits; g) principle of jurisdictionality of evidentiary precautionary orders: the 
administrative authority does not have the power to directly carry out that 
measures necessary for the investigation and processing of infractions, so that 
the processing commission must request the Judge to seek and seizure of 
documents held by the legal entity or the unavailability of assets, rights or values 
of the legal entity for civil reimbursement to public coffers (§ 1 art. 10 LAC)7. 
The punitive administrative responsibility of companies for illicit acts damaging 
corruption depends on the demonstration of three requirements: a) proactive 
conduct by the legal entity in carrying out corrupt acts, even if these have been 
committed by third parties who are not part of its staff; b) agreement or receptivity 
to the practice of illegal acts of corruption, even if extorted by public officers, it is 
not appropriate to claim irresistible moral coercion; c) practiced in your interest or 
benefit, exclusive or not, direct or indirect, sought (even if frustrated) or obtained, 
                                                     
7 See CARVALHOSA, Modesto. Considerações sobre a Lei Anticorrupção das Pessoas 
Jurídicas. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2014, p.355-357. 
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for yourself or for another legal entity, in the face of the Public Power (art. 2º 
LAC)8. 
LAC establishes the direct and isolated liability of the legal entity, completely 
unrelated to that of its administrators (individuals) and third parties as to the 
criminal, administrative-sanctioning and civil effects with respect to the harmful 
acts of corruption (art. 3o). The anti-corruption Act does not apply to corrupt public 
officers, but the liability provided for in other special criminal Acts. Thus, only the 
legal person is the active subject of the corrupt act and not its officers, managers 
and employees or third parties. Individuals respond in the criminal and civil 
spheres, at the initiative of the MP or any legitimate interested party, and not 
within the scope of the administrative process. Therefore, LAC does not require 
double imputation9, requirement also removed by STF judicial precedents in 
relation to environmental crimes10. 
The corporations convicted in the administrative proceeding are subject to two 
punitive sanctions: a) fine and b) publication of the conviction sentence. 
The administrative punitive fine (subsection I art. 6º LAC) is the main sanction 
applicable to the legal entity. The amount of the fine is not directly related to the 
damage caused to the State by the corrupt activity, but rather based on the 
criterion of 0.1% up to 20% on the company's annual gross revenue. This criterion 
can be replaced by another one consisting of a monetary value set by the 
administrative authority decision-maker (§ 4º. LAC). The civil reimbursement will 
occur in a subsequent judicial proceeding by filing a public civil action.  
Art. 7 LAC states other complementary criteria in the application of sanctions 
that act as mitigating factors for the penalty, such as the seriousness of the 
infraction; the advantage obtained or intended by the lawbreakers; the 
cooperation of the legal entity for the investigation of violations; the existence of 
internal compliance programs, auditing and encouraging the reporting of 
irregularities and the effective application of codes of ethics and conduct within 
the scope of the legal entity, among others. 
                                                     
8 CARVALHOSA, Modesto.  Considerações..., op.cit., p.52-54. 
9 CARVALHOSA, Modesto.  Considerações..., op.cit., p.65 e ss. e 186 e ss. 
10 RE 548181/PR, 1ª. T., STF, rel. Min. Rosa Weber, j. 06/08/2013. 
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2.1.2.  Judicial civil liability 
Second, the LAC provides for judicial civil liability of the legal entity as a 
necessary effect of administrative punishment. No question concerning 
administrative punishment can be discussed again in the context of public civil 
action. The conviction of the legal entity in the punitive administrative process has 
the effect of its judicial liability in the civil sphere for indemnity for the damages to 
its tutelary image of the public good through public civil action. The moral damage 
caused to the State consists of the breach of State administrative morality. The 
State is hit in its objective honor, in addition to the material damage to the public 
coffers11. Administrative condemnation for corrupt conduct is sufficient to 
generate, within the scope of public civil action, the imposition of civil liability for 
the repair of damages, and other civil sanctions provided for in art. 19 LAC: a) 
loss of assets, rights or values that represent a direct or indirect advantage or 
profit from the corruptive activity; b) the partial suspension or interdiction of its 
activities; c) the compulsory dissolution of the legal entity; d) the prohibition on 
receiving incentives, subsidies, grants, donations or loans from public bodies or 
entities and from public or controlled financial institutions, for a minimum period 
of 1 and a maximum of 5 years. 
The civil liability object of the public civil action is objective based on the risk 
created and has a non-contractual nature, for violating the duty of non-corruptive 
conduct vis-à-vis the Public Power, which may be: a) direct or by its own act; b) 
indirect or due to a third party. 
Direct or self-responsibility results from the attribution of conduct by the 
individual that is part of its (i) internal bodies: generally designated by its statutes 
or contracts, responding, in this case, directly by the legal entity's own act and 
will, or its (ii) representatives: people who are not members of any body of the 
legal entity, but who are in charge of carrying out the orders of the decision-
making bodies and the resolutions of the deliberative bodies. They can be 
individuals with employment or people who are not part of the corporate body, 
but with powers of representation. In this case, the acts performed by the 
                                                     
11 CARVALHOSA, Modesto. Considerações..., op.cit., p.394 e ss. e 406 e ss. 
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representative are equivalent to acts specific to the legal entity (responsibility for 
its own act). 
If not, that is, without powers of representation, the responsibility will be indirect 
or due to the fact of a third party (subjective), which depends on the 
demonstration of intent/negligence of the employee or agent. There will be strict 
liability for the fact of a third party between controlling, affiliated and consortium 
companies (art. 4, § 2 LAC)12.  
The extent of the civil damages suffered by the Public Power resulting from 
the crime of corruption will be determined in the administrative administrative 
procedure (art. 13 LAC) and have a different nature from the advantage or benefit 
intended or achieved by the legal entity with the corrupt activity. 
The judge, when fixing the moral reparation, must take into account the 
magnitude of the damage caused to the State's image according to its 
repercussion (Municipality, Member State or Union), dimension (involvement of 
higher political, administrative and judicial agents) and the effect of duration in 
collectivity and public opinion. 
The competent authority that, having knowledge of the infractions foreseen in 
this Act, does not take measures to determine the facts will be held criminally, 
civilly and administratively responsible under the terms of the applicable specific 
legislation (art. 27 of the LAC).  
If the competent authorities omit to promote administrative accountability, the 
MP may act as a procedural substitute in the administrative criminal proceedings 
itself, applying the sanctions provided for in art. 6 LAC, without prejudice to the 
civil sanctions provided for in art. 19 LAC13. 
The art. 4 LAC provides for the transfer of responsibility between legal entities 
involved in transformation, incorporation, merger or division operations. The 
legislator establishes limitations on the successor's liability up to the limit of the 
                                                     
12 COSTÓDIO FILHO, Ubirajara. In VV. AA. Comentários à Lei 12.846/2013 – 2a. ed.: São Paulo: 
RT, 2015, p.62 e 88 e ss.; CARVALHOSA, Modesto. Considerações..., op.cit., p.394 e ss. e 405 
e ss. 
13 CARVALHOSA, Modesto. Considerações..., op.cit., p.418. Some author considers that if the 
administrative authority omits and does not initiate the administrative procedure, the MP may, in 
the public civil action, postulate the compensation of the damages caused to the Administration 
as the application of the administrative sanctions of art. 6 LAC (BITTENCOURT, Sidney. 
Comentários à Lei Anticorrupção: Lei 12.846 - 2a. ed. - São Paulo: RT, 2015, p.170). 
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transferred assets; the inapplicability of other sanctions for acts and facts that 
occurred before the date of the merger or incorporation, except in the case of 
simulation or evident intention of fraud, duly proven, hypotheses in which the 
liability is not objective, but depends on proof of guilt (§ 1 art. 4 LAC) 
The joint and several liability of the controlling, affiliated or consortium 
companies – within the scope of the respective contract – is restricted to the 
payment of a fine and full compensation for the damage caused (§ 2 art. 4 LAC).  
2.2. Compliance programs 
The existence of internal “integrity” programs and mechanisms ('compliance 
programs') (art. 7,  subsection VIII and its sole paragraph, art. 16 LAC, and art. 
41 Decree n. 8.420/2015, of 03/18/2015, audit and incentive to report 
irregularities and the effective application of codes of ethics and conduct within 
the scope of the legal entity, will be taken into account to mitigate the sanctions 
applicable to corporations. The integrity program will be evaluated, regarding its 
existence and application, according to a series of parameters provided for in art. 
42 of Decree n. 8.420/2015).  
3. The leniency agreement 
The “leniency agreement” consists of a collaboration pact, signed between the 
administrative administrative authority and the legal entity that has effectively 
collaborated with the investigations and the administrative process, through 
which the promise of exemption from the legal entity to submit to the sanctions 
for publication of the conviction sentence (subsection II art. 6) and the prohibition 
on receiving incentives, subsidies, subsidies, donations or loans from public 
bodies or entities and from public or controlled financial institutions, for the term 
minimum of 1 and maximum of 5 years (subsection IV art. 19), and a reduction 
of up to 2/3 of the applicable fine (§ 2 art. 16 LAC). However, the leniency 
agreement does not exempt the legal entity from the obligation to fully repair the 
damage caused (§ 3 art. 16 LAC)14.  
The Comptroller General of the Union Office (CGU) is the agency that has 
exclusive competence in the Federal Executive Branch to conclude leniency 
agreements with companies investigated for harmful acts against the Public 
                                                     
14 CARVALHOSA, Modesto. Considerações..., op.cit., p.370-372. 
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Administration, pursuant to (§ 10 art. 16 LAC and Joint Ordinance n° 4, of 
08/09/2019 from CGU and Advocacia-Geral da União, from 08/01/2013. 
The Federal Prosecutor Office does not have the competence to make 
leniency agreements with companies, since it has no legitimacy to have public 
funds. The agreement eventually signed by the federal prosecutor will only come 
into force if the CGU ratifies it15.  
3.1. Requirements 
The leniency agreement may be made with the legal entities responsible for 
the practice of harmful acts of corruption, provided that they effectively 
collaborate with the investigations and the administrative process, with the result 
that: a) the identification of the others involved in the infringement, when fit; b) 
the speedy obtaining of information and documents that prove the illegal under 
investigation. 
In addition, the leniency agreement can only be entered into if the following 
requirements are cumulatively met: a) the legal entity is the first to express its 
interest in cooperating in the investigation of the illegal act; b) completely cease 
their involvement in the investigated infraction as of the date the agreement was 
filed; c) admit their participation in the crime and cooperate fully and permanently 
with the investigations and the administrative process, appearing, at their 
expense, whenever requested, to all procedural acts, until their closure (art. 16 
caput and § 1 LAC); d) compensate for the financial damage and commit to 
implementing or improving compliance programs. 
3.2. Effects 
The signing of the leniency agreement at LAC: a) will exempt the legal entity 
from the sanctions of extraordinary publication of the conviction sentence and 
from the prohibition on receiving incentives, subsidies, grants, donations or loans 
from public bodies or entities and from public or controlled financial institutions. 
public authority, for a minimum term of 1 and a maximum term of 5 years; b) it 
will reduce by up to 2/3 the amount of the applicable fine (2 art. 16 LAC). 
                                                     
15 TRF4, 3a. T., AI n. 5023972-66.2017.4.04.0000/PR, rel. Desa. Vânia Hack de Almeida, j. 
22/08/2017. 
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However, the leniency agreement does not release the legal entity from the 
obligation to fully repair the damage caused (§ 3 art. 16 LAC) . 
 On the other hand, the leniency agreement will be considered as mitigating 
the fines and publication of the conviction sentence (subsection VII art. 7 LAC). 
4. The cooperation agreement16 
For decades, Brazilian legislation has allowed the granting to individuals 
charged with criminal proceedings of certain criminal benefits as a prize for their 
collaborative work with the police or judicial authorities to the detriment of third 
parties, as a rule, in the form of “delation” with them17. 
The “cooperation agreement” is provided for in the Penal Code, in relation to 
the crime of extortion through kidnapping (§ 4º. of art. 159 CP), and also in several 
special Acts dealing with economic-financial and tax crime: § 2º of art. 25 of Act 
n. 7.492 / 86 (crimes against the national financial system); § 5º of art. 1st. of Act 
n. 9.613 / 98 (money laundering crime); art. 16, sole paragraph, of Act n. 8.137/90 
(crimes against the tax, economic and consumer relations); art. 41 of Act n. 
11.343 / 06 (Drug Prevention and Repression Act); art. 13 and 14 of Act n. 
9.807/99 (protection for victims and threatened witnesses).  
The recent Act n. 13.964/2019 – called “Anticrime Act”, included in the art. 28-
A of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter CPP) a “plea-bargain” for criminal 
penal justice, the so-called “non-criminal prosecution agreement” – also 
applicable to crimes of corruption when committed outside the context of criminal 
organizations. This agreement can be proposed and formalized in writing and 
signed by the MP, the investigated person and his defense attorney, as long as 
necessary and sufficient for the disapproval and prevention of the crime, if the 
investigated person formally and circumstantially confesses the practice of a 
                                                     
16  To express the meaning of the Portuguese term “acordo de colaboração premiada”, we prefer 
to use the term “cooperation agreement”, instead of the terms: “accomplice witness” 
(https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/accomplice_witness), “state’s evidence” (Merriam-Webster’s. 
Dictionary of Law, 1996, p.468) or “witness inducement agreements”. See generally Yvette A. 
Beeman, Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent Plea Agreements, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 800 
(1987), available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol72/iss4/5; Hon. H. Lloyd King, Jr., 
Why prosecutors are permitted to offer witness inducements: a matter of constitutional authority, 
available at https://www.stetson.edu/law/lawreview/media/why-prosecutors-are-permitted-to-
offer-witness-inducements-a-matter-of-constitutional-authority.pdf;Spencer Martinez, Bargaining 
for Testimony: Bias of Witnesses Who Testify in Exchange for Leniency, 47 Clev. St. L. Rev. 141 
(1999) available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss2/3. 
17 GOMES CANOTILHO, J. J./BRANDÃO, Nuno. Colaboração Premiada..., op.cit., p.21. 
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crime or misdemeanor without violence or serious threat and with a minimum 
penalty of less than 4 years, subject to the following cumulatively and alternatively 
adjusted conditions: a) repairing the damage or restoring the thing to the victim, 
except in the impossibility of doing so; b) voluntarily renouncing assets and rights 
indicated by the MP as instruments, proceeds or proceeds of the crime; c) provide 
service to the community or public entities for a period corresponding to the 
minimum penalty imposed on the crime reduced by one to two thirds, in a place 
to be indicated by the enforcement court, in the form of art. 46 Penal Code; d) 
pay cash benefits, to be stipulated under the terms of art. 45 CP, the public or 
social interest entity, to be appointed by the enforcement court, whose 
preferential function is to protect legal assets equal to or similar to those 
apparently injured by the offense; or e) comply, for a determined period, with 
another condition indicated by the MP, provided it is proportional and compatible 
with the attributed criminal offense. 
For the approval of the agreement, a hearing will be held in which the judge 
must verify his/her willingness – through the hearing of the investigated in the 
presence of his/her defense attorney – and its legality (§ 3 and 4 art. 28-A CPP). 
If the judge considers the conditions set out in the non-criminal prosecution 
agreement to be inadequate, insufficient or abusive, he will return the case file to 
the Public Prosecutor's Office to reformulate the proposed agreement, with the 
settlement of the investigated and his defense attorney. The judge may refuse to 
ratify the proposal that does not meet the legal requirements or when the 
adequacy is not carried out (§ 5 and 7 art. 28-A CPP). Complied with the 
agreement fully, the competent court will decree the extinction of punishment (§ 
13 art. 28-A CPP). 
[This article will only address the main aspects of the cooperation agreement 
provided in art. 3-A, of Act n. 12.850/2013 (hereinafter LOC), which regulates the 
investigation of crimes committed by criminal organizations. 
The cooperation agreement provided for in the LOC is the State's proposal to 
the accused person of the concession of certain criminal or criminal procedural 
advantages consisting of impunity or mitigation of criminal liability in exchange 
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for useful evidence for the investigation and disclosure of facts and persons 
related to the criminal organization to which it belongs18.  
4.1. Forms 
LOC provides for two modalities of an cooperation agreement: a) pre-
sentence, which can be signed prior to the offer of the prosecutor’s information, 
and b) post-sentence, later until the moment of the judgement being issued (art. 
4 §§ 1st to 4th LOC). 
If the collaboration is after the sentence, the penalty may be reduced to half or 
an improvement of the inprisonment regime will be admitted even if the objective 
requirements are absent (§ 5 art. 4º LOC).   
4.2. Requirements, conditions and effects 
The term of cooperation agreement must be made in writing and contain: a) 
the report of the collaboration and its possible results; b) the conditions of the 
proposal of the MP or by the chief police officer; c) the declaration of acceptance 
of the collaborator and his defense attorney; d) the signatures of the MP 
representative or the chief police officer, the collaborator and his defense 
attorney; e) the specification of the protection measures for the collaborator and 
his family, when necessary (art. 6º LOC).  
In the cooperation agreement, the collaborator must narrate all the illicit facts 
for which he concurred and which are directly related to the investigated facts 
(art. 3-C. § 3 LOC). 
The cooperation agreement proposal must be accompanied by a letter of 
attorney of the interested party with specific powers to initiate the collaboration 
procedure and its dealings, or signed personally by the party seeking the 
collaboration and its defense attorney or public defender (art. 3-C LOC). 
The recording of negotiations and collaborative acts must be made by means 
or resources of magnetic, stenotype, digital or similar recording techniques, 
including audiovisual, aimed at obtaining greater fidelity of information (art. 3 -C 
§ 13 LOC). 
The request for approval of the agreement will be confidentially distributed, 
containing only information that cannot identify the collaborator and his object 
                                                     
18 GOMES CANOTILHO, J. J./BRANDÃO, Nuno. Colaboração Premiada..., op.cit., p.23. 
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and will be addressed directly to the Judge, who will decide within 48 hours (art. 
7, caput and §1 LOC). 
If there is no summary rejection, the parties must sign a Confidentiality Term 
to continue the negotiations, which will bind the bodies involved in the negotiation 
and prevent the subsequent rejection without just cause (§ 2 of art. 3-B LOC). 
The receipt of the proposal to formalize a cooperation agreement marks the 
beginning of negotiations and also constitutes a mark of confidentiality, 
constituting a breach of confidentiality and breach of trust and good faith, the 
disclosure of such initial negotiations or of a document that formalizes them, until 
the lifting of secrecy by judicial decision (art. 3-B, caput, LOC). 
The cooperation agreement and the collaborator's statements will be kept 
confidential until the receipt of the information or criminal complaint (§ 3 of art. 7º 
LOC). 
Access to the case file will be restricted to the judge, the MP and the chief 
police officer, as a way of guaranteeing the success of the investigations, 
ensuring the defense attorney, in the interest of the represented, ample access 
to the evidence relating to the exercise of the right of defense, duly preceded by 
judicial authorization, except for those related to ongoing proceedings (§ 2 of art. 
7º LOC). Therefore, the defense counsel does not have unrestricted access to all 
statements made, but only to the evidence resulting from the cooperation 
agreement that concerns him in the exercise of his right of defense. The STF's 
case law, based on statement 14 of its binding judicial precedent, has been 
ensuring that the person reported by a judge, in terms of a cooperation 
agreement, has the right of access to all the evidence already documented in the 
records of the collaboration agreements, including the audiovisual recordings of 
the acts of collaboration of codefendant, with the scope of confronting them, and 
not to challenge the terms of the agreements themselves, provided that two 
requirements are present: a) the act of collaboration must point out the applicant's 
criminal responsibility; b) the act of collaboration should not refer to the diligence 
in progress19.    
                                                     
19 Rcl 21.258 AgR) (Rcl 30742 AgR/SP, 2ª. T., STF, rel. Min. Ricardo Lewandowski, j. 04/2/2020; 
See also the PET 6.601 e 7.356, 2ª. T., STF, rel. Min. Edson Facchin, judgment not yet concluded 
awaiting the vote of Min.Carmen Lúcia.  
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In addition, the STF has been deciding that the accused has no legitimacy to 
challenge the cooperation agreement. As it is a very personal legal business, the 
cooperation agreement cannot be challenged by co-actors or accomplices of the 
collaborator in the criminal organization and in the criminal offenses committed 
by him, even if they will be expressly named in the respective instrument in the 
“collaboration report and their possible results ”(art. 6, I, Act n. 12.850/2013). It is 
because his interest is restricted to the evidence obtained from the cooperation 
agreement, and eventual criminal action would be the proper forum for this 
challenge. However, in the proceedings in which they appear as accused, the 
coauthors or reported accomplices – in the exercise of the adversarial principle – 
may confront, in court, the collaborator's statements and the evidence indicated 
by him, as well as challenge, at any time, the measures restrictions on 
fundamental rights eventually adopted to their disadvantage20.   
The cooperation agreement has the legal nature of a procedural legal bargain 
and means of obtaining evidence, which presupposes public utility and interest 
(art. 3º-A LOC)21. Thus, the cooperation agreement has a mixed nature with a 
twofold effect: (i) procedural: in its form and in its content it has the nature of a) 
means of obtaining incriminating evidence – and not exactly a type of evidence – 
both from the collaborator himself and mainly third parties; b) implies not offering 
a information; (ii) material: produces material effects of a penalty22.  
The cooperation agreement can benefit the collaborator with four (04) benefits 
(the first three has criminal nature and the last criminal procedure) that the judge 
may, at the request of the parties, apply alternatively (and not cumulatively) : a) 
grant judicial mercy (exemption from any penalti); b) reduce the penalty of 
deprivation of liberty by up to 2/3 (two thirds); c) replace it by restricting the rights 
of those who have collaborated effectively and voluntarily with the investigation 
and the criminal process; d) not offering a information by the MP, if the proposal 
                                                     
20 HC 127483/PR, STF, Tribunal Pleno, rel. Min. Dias Toffoli, j. 27/08/2015; Inq 4405 AgR, DF, 
rel. Min. Roberto Barroso, 1ª. T., STF, j. 27/02/2018; PET 7.226, rel. Min. Luiz Fux, j. 27/11/2017. 
21 The STF had already decided so even before this recent legislative change: HC 127483/ PR, 
STF, Tribunal Pleno, rel. Min. Dias Toffoli, j. 27/08/2015. 
22 GOMES CANOTILHO, J. J./BRANDÃO, Nuno. Colaboração Premiada..., op.cit., p.23; 
SANTOS, Marcos Paulo Dutra. Colaboração (delação) Premiada. Salvador: Jus Podium editora, 
2016, p.86-87; HC 127483/ PR, STF, Tribunal Pleno, rel. Min. Dias Toffoli, j. 27/08/2015. 
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for a collaboration agreement refers to an infraction the existence of which has 
not been previously known and the collaborator: (i) is not the leader of the criminal 
organization; (ii) is the first to provide effective collaboration under the terms of 
this article (§ 4 art. 4º LOC). 
The cooperation agreement may provide for the confiscation of assets (as an 
extrapenal effect of a patrimonial nature of the conviction) acquired with the 
product of the infraction by the collaborating agent, in view of the existence of a 
provision in Conventions signed by Brazil so that “the measures appropriate to 
encourage” ”forms of cooperation agreements (art. 26.1 of the Palermo 
Convention) and for“ mitigation of the penalty ”(art. 37.2 of the Mérida 
Convention), in order to mitigate the consequences of crime23. 
In any case, the granting of the benefit will take into account the collaborator's 
personality, nature, circumstances, severity and social repercussion of the 
criminal fact and the effectiveness of the collaboration (§ 1 art. 4º LOC). However, 
the collaborator's personality or the confidence inspired by it does not constitute 
an element of existence or a requirement for the validity of the collaboration 
agreement, but only a vector to be considered in the establishment of its clauses, 
notably in the choice of the premium sanction to which it will be entitled the 
collaborator, as well as when the sanction is applied by the judge in the 
sentence24. 
The judicial granting of premium benefits will always be conditioned to the 
effectiveness of the collaboration. Once the states evidence agreement is made, 
the judge will analyze, at the time of approval, the adequacy of the collaboration 
results to the minimum legally required results (subsection III of § 7 art. 4 LOC). 
The judge will examine whether the collaborator has fulfilled all agreed 
obligations and whether one or more results legally required in subsections I to 
V of art. 4 LOC were reached, namely: a) the identification of the other co-authors 
and participants in the criminal organization and the criminal offenses committed 
by them; b) disclosure of the criminal organization's hierarchical structure and 
division of tasks; c) the prevention of criminal offenses arising from the activities 
                                                     
23 HC 127483/ PR, STF, Tribunal Pleno, rel. Min. Dias Toffoli, j. 27/08/2015. 
24 HC 127483/ PR, STF, Tribunal Pleno, rel. Min. Dias Toffoli, j. 27/08/2015. 
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of the criminal organization; d) the total or partial recovery of the product or the 
benefit of criminal offenses committed by the criminal organization; e) the location 
of any victim with his physical integrity preserved. 
The non-compliance that is restricted to the previous collaboration agreement, 
does not prevent, a priori, the bargain of future agreements of the same nature25. 
4.3. The role of the Public Prosecutor’s office 
In relation to the participating subjects, the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
(hereinafter MP), as "dominus litis" of public criminal action, under the terms of 
art. 129, subsection I, of the CF, assumes the role of protagonist of the 
cooperation agreements. 
Within the scope of cooperation agreement cases, the legislator made more 
flexible several traditional principles in criminal proceedings: a) the principle of 
mandatory public criminal action (art. 24 CPP); b) the indivisibility of public 
criminal action, since – despite the just cause for triggering the prosecution – 
does not offer a information (decides to file the investigation for lack of interest in 
acting) against the whistleblower; c) the principle of procedural legality in favor of 
the principle of regulated opportunity26.  
The proposal for cooperation agreement may be summarily rejected, with due 
justification, making the interested party aware (§ 1 of art. 3-B LOC). 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court considered it inadmissible for the Judiciary 
to oblige the MP to formalize a cooperation agreement, despite the voluntary 
collaboration activity of the collaborator, if the corroboration elements presented 
are not of the consistency necessary to elucidate what was reported, nor are they 
conclusive as to the certification of the irregularities pointed out. This motivated 
valuation of the MP, from a business point of view, is not subject to the scrutiny 
of the Judiciary, under the risk of directly affecting the formation of the 
independent ministerial conviction. Therefore, based on the accusatory principle 
and the regulated discretion, it is exclusively up to the MP to evaluate the 
                                                     
25 HC 127483/ PR, STF, Tribunal Pleno, rel. Min. Dias Toffoli, j. 27/08/2015. 
26 SANTOS, Marcos Paulo Dutra. Colaboração (delação) Premiada, op.cit., p.150-153; VALDEZ 
PEREIRA, Frederico. Delação Premiada. Legitimidade e Procedimento. 3a. ed., Curitiba: Juruá 
editora, 2016, p.143.  
 




Università degli Studi di Salerno 
 
18 
convenience and the opportunity to conclude the negotiation act, safeguarding, 
however, the subjective rights of the agent, in case of non-formalization of the 
agreement, to granting of premium sanctions by the judge State at the time of the 
sentence. This question, however, could be subject to eventual scrutiny at the 
internal level of the MP Office, applying, by analogy, art. 28 CPP)27.   
The receipt of a collaboration proposal for analysis or the Confidentiality Term 
does not, in itself, imply the suspension of the investigation, except for an 
agreement to the contrary regarding the proposition of precautionary and criminal 
procedural measures, as well as civil procedural measures admitted by civil 
procedural law in force (§ 3 of art. 3-B LOC).   
The cooperation agreement may be preceded by an instruction, when there is 
a need to identify or complement its object, the facts narrated, its legal definition, 
relevance, utility and public interest (§ 4º art. 3 - B LOC). 
The STF examined the constitutionality of §§ 2 and 6 of art. 4 LOC and decided 
that the chief police officer can also formalize cooperation agreements – which 
presupposes the phase of police investigation –, however, it is up to the 
subsequent manifestation of the MP, which must manifest, without binding 
character, previously to the court decision28. 
The legislator expressly guarantees a series of subjective rights to the 
collaborator, namely: a) to enjoy the protection measures provided for in the 
specific legislation; b) have your name, qualification, image and other personal 
information preserved; c) be conducted, in court, separately from other co-
authors and accomplices; d) participate in hearings without eye contact with the 
other accused; e) not having your identity revealed by the media, nor being 
photographed or filmed, without your prior written authorization; f) serve the 
sentence or preventive detention in a criminal establishment other than the other 
prisoners or convicts (art. 5º LOC).  
4.4. The role of the defense attorney 
In all acts of negotiation, confirmation and execution of the collaboration 
agreement, the collaborator must be assisted by a defense attorney (§ 1 of art. 3 
                                                     
27 MS 35693 AgR/DF, 2ª. T., STF, rel. Min. Edson Fachin, j. 28/05/2019. 
28 ADI 5508/DF, STF, rel. Min. Marco Aurélio, j. 20/06/2018. 
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- C LOC). The assistance of a defense attorney is an essential guarantee to 
ensure that the accused's collaboration with the MP or chief police officer is 
voluntary and aware of its consequences. The lack of intervention by the 
defendant's attorney, since the beginning of the deal dealings, generates 
absolute procedural nullity of the cooperation agreement (art. 564, subsection III, 
and art. 572, a contrario sensu, both from CPP)29. 
Once the agreement has been made, the respective term, the collaborator’s 
statements and a copy of the investigation will be sent to the judicial analysis, 
and the judge must listen to the collaborator in secret, accompanied by his 
defense attorney (§ 7 art. 3-C LOC). 
The STF was already deciding that the denounced defendants have the right 
to present defensive closing argument written after the term of the defending 
collaborators, and it is not permissible to set a common term for the defending 
collaborators and denounced, under penalty of nullity for offense to the 
fundamental law rules, contradictory and wide-ranging defense (subsections LIV 
and LV article 5 CF), regardless of the existence of an express provision of 
infraconstitutional rules30. The recent legislative change expressly stipuleted this 
guarantee: “at all stages of the process, the accused defendant must be 
guaranteed the opportunity to speak up after the expiry of the period granted to 
the defendant who reported it.” (§ 10-A art. 3-C LOC). 
4.5. The role of the judge  
The judge will not participate in the negotiations carried out between the 
parties for the formalization of the collaboration agreement, which will take place 
between the chief police officer, the investigated and the defense attorney, with 
the manifestation of the MP, or, as the case may be, between the MP and the 
investigated or accused and his defense attorney (§ 6 art. 4 LOC).  
In the initial stage, the role of the judge or court essentially consists in the 
approval and, in the later step, in the jurisdictional review of the cooperation 
agreement, an opportunity in which to carry out a regularity and legality control of 
                                                     
29 SANTOS, Marcos Paulo Dutra. Colaboração..., op.cit., p.125 e 128. 
30 HC 157627 AgR/PR, 2ª. T., STF, rel. orig. Min. Edson Fachin, red. for the judgement Min. 
Ricardo Lewandowski, j. 27/08/2019; HC 166373/PR, STF, rel. Min. Edson Fachin, j. 25 e 
26/09/2019.   
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the agreement, the voluntariness of the collaborator's expression of will, 
especially in cases in which it is or has been under the effect of preventive 
coercitive measures (for example, pre-trial detention), as well as its adequacy to 
the results of the collaboration (§ 7, subsections I to IV, art. 4 LOC)31. 
The judge must refuse the approval of the proposal that does not comply with 
the legal requirements, returning it to the parties for the necessary adjustments 
(§ 8 of art. 4 LOC) by means of the suppression or alteration of illegal or 
unconstitutional clauses. In addition, it is up to the judge to clarify to the 
collaborator that the agreement does not have an absolute binding force, since 
only in the sentence will the terms of the agreement and its objective 
effectiveness verified by the judge. However, the STF considers that the 
collaborator has a subjective right to the benefit of the premium sanction, as long 
as their collaboration is effective and produces the desired results. The principles 
of legal certainty and protection of trust make the State's duty to honor the 
commitment assumed in the cooperation agreement indeclinable, granting the 
stipulated premium sanction, legitimate consideration for the collaborator's 
performance of the obligation32. 
In a second step, the judge or Court must proceed to a reasoned analysis of 
the merits of the information, the judicial mercy and the first stages of application 
of the sentence, before granting the agreed benefits, except when the agreement 
provides for the non-offering of the penalty information (§§ 4 and 4-A art. 4 LOC) 
or sentence has already been rendered (§ 7º-A art. 4 LOC). The STF had already 
decided that the judicial control in the ratification of the penal agreement also 
covers the assessment of the legitimacy of criminal prosecution in cooperation 
agreements, criminal transactions or conditional suspension of the process, so 
that the cases of manifest atypical conduct narrated, extinction of the punishment 
of the accused or evident impracticability of the information due to absence of 
just cause, result in the proposal not being approved. In view of the risks inherent 
to criminal business justice, the accused's consent, even if assisted by a technical 
defender, cannot be overvalued to the point of removing any need for judicial 
                                                     
31 See in this sense: HC 127483/ PR, STF, Tribunal Pleno, rel.  Min. Dias Toffoli, j.  27/08/2015. 
32 HC 127483/ PR, STF, Tribunal Pleno, rel.  Min. Dias Toffoli, j. 27/08/2015. 
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control33. Thus, the sentence will analyze the terms of the approved agreement 
and its effectiveness (§ 11 art. 4 LOC). In this way, according to the STF, the 
judge or Court responsible for the case may review and annul the ratified 
agreement, in the sentence of the process originating from the information, in 
case of non-compliance with the duties assumed, if it is discovered, during the 
process, facts that demonstrate illegalities or defects in the negotiation of the 
collaboration, such as: corruption of the judge, coercion of one of the parties, 
false evidence or judicial error34.   
The cooperation agreement may be rescinded in two cases: a) willful omission 
by the collaborator on the facts object of the collaboration (§ 17 art. 4 LOC); b) 
the collaborator's persistence in engaging in illegal conduct related to the object 
of the collaboration (§ 18 art. 4 LOC). 
4.5.1. The judicial control 
Regarding the constitutionality of the cooperation agreement, it should be 
mentioned that in 2004 Brazil subscribed and incorporated the United Nations 
Convention against Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) in its domestic law, 
whose article 26 and §§ urge each State Party to consider the possibility of 
cooperation agreement by reducing the penalty or granting judicial mercy. In 
addition, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (Mérida Convention), 
promulgated by Brazil, in its art. 37 provides for sentence reduction and judicial 
mercy in § 2 and 3. The STF also highlighted the existence of provision in 
Conventions signed by Brazil so that appropriate measures are adopted to 
encourage forms of cooperation agreements” (art. 26(1) of the Palermo 
Convention) and for “penalty mitigation" (art. 37(2) of the Convention de Mérida), 
in the sense of mitigating the consequences of the crime, by establishing the 
premium sanctions to which the collaborator is entitled35. 
In this way, the option of a cooperation agreement is a benefit that integrates 
the range of defense strategies available to the investigated or accused, either to 
                                                     
33 Accordind the vote of Min. Gilmar Mendes no HC 176.785/DF, 2a. T., STF, j. 17/12/2019. 
34  Pet 7074 QO/DF, Pleno do STF, rel. Min. Edson Fachin, j. 21, 22, 28 e 29.6.2017; Pet 7074/DF, 
rel. Min. Edson Fachin, j. 21, 22, 28 e 29.6.2017, STF Newsletter n. 870, june/2017. 
35 HC 127483/PR, STF, Tribunal Pleno, rel. Min. Dias Toffoli, j. 27/08/2015, DJe 04-02-2016; see 
in this sense too: SANTOS, Marcos Paulo Dutra. Colaboração (delação) Premiada, op.cit., p.76 
e 78. 
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preserve their “libertatis status” from the beginning, or to reduce, exempt, replace 
the penalty or modify their compliance regime so that it enhances both due 
process and broad defense36. 
However, the cooperation agreement creates undeniable risks to constitutional 
rights and principles. Thus, its constitutionality requires that cooperation 
agreement be considered an exceptional solution to control exceptional criminal 
problems, characterized by their gravity and complexity of investigation, and 
always strictly subordinated to the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege), 
proportionality (prohibition of excess) and intangibility of essential core of 
fundamental rights37.   
Therefore, the due process of law clause must be scrupulously observed 
(subsection LIV art. 5 Federal Constitucion (hereinafter CF), according to which 
“no one will be deprived of liberty or of his property without due process law". In 
the Democratic Rule of Law, legitimation depends on strict adherence to a 
specific, previously formally defined procedure. Protecting the formality of the 
process is no less important than convicting the guilty and restoring legal peace38.  
It is essential, therefore that the judge or Court uses its supervisory powers in 
the initial control and subsequent review of the terms and content of the 
cooperation agreements as to legality, regularity, voluntariness and objective 
effectiveness, as to their ability to ensure their full legitimacy and compatibility 
with the constitutional rights. 
This procedural compliance must be examined by the judge in the act of 
homologation provided for in § 7 art. 4 LOC, which must be refused if the 
procedure that culminated in the cooperation agreement does not fit the legally 
established procedural iter. New control of procedural correction will be made by 
the judge later in the sentence of eventual granting of previously agreed 
benefits39.  
                                                     
36 SANTOS, Marcos Paulo Dutra. Colaboração (delação) Premiada, op.cit., p.75-76. 
37 GOMES CANOTILHO, J. J./BRANDÃO, Nuno.  GOMES CANOTILHO, J. J./BRANDÃO, Nuno. 
Colaboração Premiada e auxílio judiciário em matéria penal: a ordem pública como obstáculo à 
cooperação com a operação lava jato. In Revista de Legislação e de Jurisprudência. n. 4000, 
ano 146, Setembro-Outubro, 2016, p.23-24. 
38 GOMES CANOTILHO, J. J./BRANDÃO, Nuno. Colaboração Premiada..., op.cit., p.25. 
39 GOMES CANOTILHO, J. J./BRANDÃO, Nuno. Colaboração Premiada..., op.cit., p.25. 
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The STF starts from the premise that the setting of premium sanctions not 
expressly provided for LOC, but freely and consciously accepted by the 
investigated, does not render the agreement invalid, as the principle of legality, 
which prohibits the imposition of more severe penalties. than those provided for 
by law, it is a guarantee instituted in favor of the jurisdicted person before the 
State, so that this principle does not violate the setting of a more favorable 
penalty, there being no mention of safeguarding the guarantee against the 
guarantor40.  
However, in subsequent precedents, the STF departed from this initial premise 
and decided that there is no legal authorization for the contracting parties to 
agree, in advance, in a collaboration agreement, replacing the Judiciary, the 
species, the level and the serving sentece regime, cases of suspension of the 
criminal process or set deadlines and legal frameworks for fluency of the 
prescription different from those established by law. Validating such an aspect of 
the agreement would correspond to allowing the MP, the prosecution organ, to 
act as legislator, establishing, in advance, the accused, criminal penalties not 
provided for in the legal system. It is the Judiciary that has, by virtue of 
constitutional provisions, the monopoly of jurisdiction, and it is only through a 
condemnatory criminal sentence, handed down by a competent magistrate, that 
it is possible to establish or forgive custodial sentences in relation to any 
jurisdiction, especially when there is no judicial process in progress41. 
The recent legislative reform considers that the clauses stipulated in the 
cooperation agreement are null and void, which violate the legal criteria for the 
definition of the legal regime and the requirements of serving time, except for the 
possibility of improvement of the imprisonment regime even though the objective 
requirements, if the cooperation agreement is awarded after the sentence of 
conviction (subsection II of § 7 of article 4 of the LOC).  
The legislation also expressly establishes that in the testimonies that they 
provide, the collaborator will renounce, in the presence of his defense attorney, 
                                                     
40 Inq 4405/DF, STF, 1a. T., AgR, rel. Min. Roberto Barroso, j. 27/02/2018. 
41 See decision of Min. Lewandowski in the PET 7265/DF, j. 14/11/2017 and decision of Min. 
Celso de Mello in the ADIn n. 5.508/DF, rel. Min. Marco Aurélio, j. 20/06/2018; GOMES 
CANOTILHO, J. J./BRANDÃO, Nuno.  Colaboração Premiada..., op. cit., p.27 e 31-33. 




Università degli Studi di Salerno 
 
24 
the right to silence and will be subject to the legal commitment to tell the truth (§ 
14 art. 4 LOC). This waiver by the collaborator in the cooperation agreement does 
not violates the constitutional guarantee of “remaining silent” (subsection LXIII of 
art. 5 CF), in whose clause the fundamental right of non-self-incrimination is 
inserted (nemo tenetur se detegere/privilege against self incrimination), in 
accordance with decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court and the USA Supreme Court42. 
Nevertheless, the infraconstitutional legislator has established a series of legal 
limits in order to ensure the compatibility of the collaborator's waiver with the 
privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, the promise of benefits in the 
cooperation agreement that are legally inadmissible, that is, without legal 
coverage, such as the guarantee of impunity offered to a defendant to incriminate 
his accomplice, constitute illegally obtained evidence; statements extorted 
through manipulation and deception do not represent an exercise in freedom and 
self-determination, so that it violates privilege against self incrimination (nemo 
tenetur se ipsum acusare)43.  
The legislator also establishes that “the provisions of waiver of the right to 
challenge the homologatory decision are null and void” (§ 7º-B of art. 4 LOC). 
The STF had already recognized that there is no effect before the Judiciary that 
the general and unrestricted waiver of the guarantee against self-incrimination 
and the right to silence, as well as the early withdrawal of the presentation of 
appeals, since such waivers, to all evidence, violate fundamental rights and 
guarantees of the collaborator44.  
On the other hand, “in the event that the agreement is not entered into at the 
initiative of the celebrant, he may not use any of the information or evidence 
presented by the collaborator, in good faith, for any other purpose (§ 6 of art. 3-
B LOC). 
                                                     
42 See VALDEZ PEREIRA, Frederico. Delação Premiada…, op.cit., p.63 e notas 109 -110. 
43 GOMES CANOTILHO, J. J./BRANDÃO, Nuno. Colaboração Premiada..., op.cit., p.35-37. The 
Brazilian CF provides that “evidence obtained by unlawful means is inadmissible in the process” 
(subsection LVI of art. 5th.); the CPP (art. 157) provides that "those obtained in violation of 
constitutional or legal rules" are understood as such”.  
44 See decision in the PET 7265/DF, j. 14/11/2017, rel.  Min. Lewandowski. 
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Another limitation established by the recent legislative reform is that “the 
parties can retract the proposal, in which case the self-incriminating evidence 
produced by the collaborator cannot be used exclusively to his disadvantage” (§ 
10 art. 4 LOC), however, can be valued against third parties involved in the crime. 
The legislator also expressly included the prohibition of “receipt of a 
information or criminal complaint” or of a “sentence of conviction” based only on 
the collaborator's statements (subsections II and III of § 16 art. 4 LOC). The STF 
had previously rejected accusations (informations or complaints) based 
exclusively on a unilateral statement by the collaborator45. 
Furthermore, the STF had also already decided that enacting preventive 
detention based only on cooperation agreement violates the law and the CF46. 
This case law guidelines was accepted by the recent legislative reform that 
expressly prohibited the enactment of any preventive coercitive measures based 
only on the colaborator's statements (subsection I of § 16 art. 4 LOC). 
On the other hand, order a pretrial detention as a mechanism to obtain a 
cooperation agreement violates the constitutional right that protects the citizen 
against self-incrimination. Any deviation in purpose, through the use of punitive 
purposes in anticipation of punishment or apocryphal grounds with the use of 
another coverage rule is illegal and unconstitutional for violation of the principle 
of legality (nulla coactio sine lege), the principle of reasonableness/ 
proportionality (subprinciple of adequacy), the presumption of innocence, the 
right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination (nemo tenetur se ipsum 
accusare) and the guarantee of judicial impartiality47.  
The STF addressed this issue of the hidden or apocryphal grounds of pre-trial 
detention and rejected the possibility of pretrial detention in order to obtain 
confession in a cooperation agreement. Thus, if preventive detention has solid 
                                                     
45 Inq 4005/DF, 2ª. T., STF, rel. Min. Edson Fachin, rel. for the judgement Min. Gilmar Mendes, 
j.11/12/2018; Inq 3994, DF, 2a. T., STF, rel. Min. Edson Fachin, rel. for the judgement Min. Dias 
Toffoli, j. 18/12/2017. 
46 HC 169119/RJ, 2ª. T., STF, rel. Min. Gilmar Mendes, j. 02/04/2019. 
47 SANGUINÉ, Odone. Prisión provisional y derechos fundamentales. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 
2003, p. 645 e ss.; ID. A inconstitucionalidade do clamor público como fundamento da prisão 
preventiva. Estudos Criminais em Homenagem a Evandro Lins e Silva (Criminalista do Século). 
São Paulo: Ed. Método, 2001, p. 257 e ss.  




Università degli Studi di Salerno 
 
26 
grounds, which make its fit unequivocal, a supposed hidden purpose loses its 
importance. Any provision by the Public Ministry to negotiate the prisoner's 
collaboration will not be linked to the prison. However, if the grounds for the 
pretrial detention are found to be that the lack of cooperation to clarify the facts 
constituted a determining factor in ordering that measure, there is a clear reason 
for the annulment of the decision and to consider the evidence derived therefrom 
to be illegal. In summary, if it is found that the real purpose (hidden or apocryphal) 
of the preventive prison is to force the defendant's collaboration, it is up to the 
Court to annul that decision for manifest illegality and unconstitutionality, for 
violating the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Therefore, it is forbidden pretrial detention or remand as a bargaining instrument 
in order to coerce the investigated or accused person to collaborate48. In order to 
avoid the decree of the pretrial deterntion with the spurious purpose of a coercive 
mechanism to obtain the cooperation agreement, the recent legislative reform 
establishes that the judge will obligatorily analyze, among other aspects, in the 
homologation, “the voluntariness of the manifestation of will when the collaborator 
is or was subject to preventive coercitive measures” (subsection IV of § 7 art. 4 
LOC). 
In addition, non compliance with a cooperation agreement does not constitute 
a cause for the imposition or reestablishment of the previously revoked pretrial 
detention, since there is no necessary relationship between the conclusion and/or 
noncompliance of a cooperation agreement and the judgment of adequacy of 
serious preventive measures. The pretrial detention requires the presence of any 
of the requirements provided for in art. 312 CPP49.  
5. Concluding remarks 
                                                     
48 SANGUINÉ, Odone. A inconstitucionalidade da prisão cautelar como mecanismo para obter a 
delação (colaboração) premiada. In: SANTORO, Antonio Eduardo Ramires; MALAN, Diogo 
Rudge; MADURO, Flávio Mirza. (Org.). Crise no processo penal contemporâneo: escritos em 
homenagem aos 30 anos da Constituição de 1988. 1a.ed. Belo Horizonte: D'Plácido, 2018, p. 
331-346; CAPEZ, Rodrigo. Prisão e medidas cautelares diversas. A individualização da medida 
cautelar no processo penal. São Paulo: Quartier Latin, 2017, p.430-431; SANTOS, Marcos Paulo 
Dutra. Colaboração (delação) Premiada, op.cit., p.131; see decision of Min. Gilmar Mendes, 
HC/MC SP n. 156.600, STF, j.11/05/2018; HC 127186/PR, STF, 2a. T., rel. Min. Teori Zavascki, 
j. 28/04/2015. 
49 HC 138207, PR, 2a. T., STF, rel. Min. Edson Fachin, j. 25/04/2017.     




Università degli Studi di Salerno 
 
27 
After this outline of the legislative and judicial precedents panorama of the 
strategies to control corruption in Brazil, it is necessary expose some brief final 
remarks. 
According to updated data until December 2019, CGU, together with AGU, 
signed eleven leniency agreements with companies investigated for the harmful 
acts provided for in the Anticorruption Act and for the administrative offenses 
provided for in the Bidding Act n. 8.666 / 1993 and adjusted the return of R$ 13.67 
billion, having already returned R$ 3.12 billion to public coffers. Another 22 
leniency agreements were in progress50. According to Federal Prosecution 
Agency sources, updated until March 2020, more than R$ 4 billion have already 
been returned through 185 collaboration agreements and 14 leniency 
agreements, in which the return of approximately R$ 14.3 billion has been 
adjusted51. The three largest agreements for the practice of crimes investigated 
in the context of Operation “Lava Jato”, were entered into with the contractors 
Odebrecht (R$ 2.7 billion); Braskem (R $ 2.87 billion) and OAS (R $ 1.9 billion to 
the Union until December 2047)52.  
Therefore, there is a real effectiveness of leniency and cooperation 
agreements as criminal policy strategies to the control of corruption in Brazil. 
This effectiveness became a reality not only due to the current legislation, but 
especially by the joint work of independent institutions: an MP independent from 
the Executive Power; cooperation of the investigative task force composed of the 
MP and the Federal Police, and an independent Judiciary Power, with emphasis 
on the judicial control made by the STF establishing limits to the “Lava Jato” 
operation. Also, the important alterations of the LOC included by the new 
“Anticrime Act” acquire relevance, accepting the main guarantee standards 
established by the STF, and adding others that contribute to the improvement 
                                                     
50 See https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/assuntos/responsabilizacao-de-empresas/lei-
anticorrupcao/acordo-leniencia, acesso em 06/04/2020. 
51 See: http://www.mpf.mp.br/pr/sala-de-imprensa/noticias-pr/lava-jato-completa-seis-anos-com-
500-pessoas-denunciadas-e-numeros-recordes-em-2019, 
acess in 04/06/2020. 
52 See: https://economia.uol.com.br/noticias/estadao-conteudo/2019/11/14/oas-fecha-leniencia-
de-r-19-bi-terceiro-maior-acordo-da-historia.htm, acess in 04/06/2020. 
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and evolution of the institute of the cooperation agreement according to the 
canons of the Rule of Law. 
 
